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LEGISLATION

CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY: FLORIDA LEGISLATIVE
REFORM OF M'NAGHTEN
United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966)
Appellant was arrested on two counts of selling narcotics and

brought to trial before the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York. In his defense the appellant contended that, at the time of the narcotics sale, he did not possess sufficient capacity and will to be held responsible for the criminality of
his acts. The defendant's alleged condition failed to satisfy the rigid
requirements of the M'Naghten "right and wrong" test of criminal
responsibility,1 and he was convicted. On appeal the United States
Court of Appeals, Second Circuit HELD, the M'Naghten formula
would no longer serve as the test for criminal responsibility in that
circuit. In its place the court adopted the Model Penal Code proposal of the American Law Institute. The conviction was reversed
and the case remanded for a new trial under the ALI test for criminal
responsibility.
While the most topical controversies in criminal law today concern
the rights of an accused, Freeman is a reminder that the provocative
riddle of criminal responsibility remains unsolved. Efforts to supplement or replace the M'Naghten Rule with a more meaningful test
have persisted for generations with varying degrees of success. Yet
despite a flood of literature from both legal and behavioral scholars
inveighing against the retention of M'Naghten, Florida and a majority of states continue to adhere to the 123-year-old template that
supposedly separates the sick from the wicked.2 Although the Florida
Supreme Court has acknowledged that the M'Naghten test is unsatisfactory, 3 it refuses to change for want of a more suitable substitute.4 But the impossibility of attaining perfection is no excuse
1. M'Naghten's Case, 10 Clark & F., 200, 210, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (H.L. 1843).
"T]o establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be dearly proved
that, at die time of committing of the act, the party accused was labouring under
such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and
quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he
was doing what was wrong. The mode of putting the latter part of the question
to the jury on these occasions has generally been, whether the accused at the
time of doing the act knew the difference between right and wrong ...."
2. See Moore, M'Naghten Is Dead- Or Is It?, 3 HOUSTON L. REv. 58 (1965);
Note, Why Not Bury M'Naghten's Moldy Ghost?, 12 U. FLA. L. Riv. 184 (1959).
3. Piccott v. State, 116 So. 2d 626, 631 (Fla. 1959) (Hobson, J. dissenting in
part), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 293 (1960).
4. To date Florida has considered and rejected the "irresistible impulse" test
and the Durham or New Hampshire Rule. See Cole v. State, 172 So. 2d 898 (3d
D.C.A. Fla. 1965); Piccott v. State, note 3 supra; Davis v. State, 44 Fla. 32, 32 So.

822 (1902).
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for an "ostrich approach" toward the problem of criminal responsibility. While Florida is marking time, others have responded to the
persuasive advocacy of change. Several federal courts and a few state
legislatures have made considerable improvements on their tests for
legal insanity. Significantly, the most recent developments appear to
be patterned after the American Law Institute test adopted in Freeman. As Florida has never considered the ALI proposal, its new
language may offer the guidelines needed to renovate M'Naghten.
The Model Penal Code test of legal insanity evolved from an extensive study of criminal conduct initiated by the American Law
Institute in 1953. Leading legal and medical minds applied themselves to the task of articulating a definitive formula for criminal
responsibility. After nine years of research and consideration, section
4.01 was formally adopted by the Institute. The ALI test provides: 5
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at
the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the
criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his
conduct to the requirements of the law.
(2) The terms "mental disease or defect" do not include
abnormality manifested only by repeated or otherwise antisocial conduct.
Since its inception, the ALI test has been adopted verbatim by
the Second 6 and Tenth7 Circuit Courts of Appeals. Other circuit
courts have drawn from the language of the Model Penal Code in
fashioning tests of their own. In each instance there was implicit
recognition that the recipe for criminal responsibility promulgated
by the American Law Institute contains indispensable ingredients
that the law cannot afford to ignore.
The ALI formula is composed of two principal ingredients,
knowledge of behavior and control of behavior. While the
M'Naghten test acquits a defendant only for lack of knowledge, the
ALI formula will not attach liability if either ingredient is substantially lacking. Similarly, in approaching the problem of criminal
responsibility, the circuit courts of appeals have endeavored to break
down behavior into its various elements. In United States v. Currens,8
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals chose to emphasize the element
of control. The court reasoned from the premise that mens rea is
is based on an assumption that a person has a capacity to control his
MODEL PENAL CODE §4.01
(Final Draft 1962).
6. United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966).
7. Wion v. United States, 325 F.2d 420, 430 (10th Cir. 1963).
8. 290 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961).

5.
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behavior and to choose between alternative courses of conduct. Accordingly, where there is a reasonable doubt whether the actor possesses capacity of choice and control, there is a reasonable doubt
that he possessed the necessary guilty mind.9 The cardinal issue for
determination, according to the court, was whether the actor had
substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of
law. In fact, the court was so concerned about emphasizing the capacity to control behavior that it elected to delete all reference to
the cognitive element in fashioning its test.'0 In Dusky v. United
States,"' the Eighth Circuit expressed its preference of tests in terms
of three necessary elements: the defendant's cognition, his volition,
and his capacity to control his behavior. "If those 3 elements .. .
are emphasized in the court's charge as essential constituents of the
defendant's legal sanity, we suspect that the exact wording of the
charge and the actual name of the test are comparatively unimportant
.. "...12 Again, in Feguer v. United States, 3 the Eighth Circuit articu4
lated its three requisites as "knowledge, will, and choice.'
Perhaps the most notable testimony to the success of the ALI
proposal is found in its use to amend the provisions of a previous
rule promulgated in Durham v. United States.'5 In McDonald v.
United States,'6 the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia relied on language of the American Law Institute in attempting to correct the existing deficiencies in its own test. The
Durham court redefined mental disease and defect to include "any
abnormal condition of the mind which substantially affects mental or
emotional processes and substantially impairs behavioral controls."' 7
Like the Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third, Eighth, and
Tenth Circuits, the Durham court has recognized that capacity for
self-control is a necessary ingredient to any comprehensive test of
criminal responsibility.
Although the Fifth Circuit still abides by M'Naghten, there has
been some indication that the court is ready to amend the tra9. Id. at 773.
10. The rule adopted in Currens provided: "The jury must be satisfied that
at the time of committing the prohibited act the defendant, as a result of mental
disease or defect, lacked substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law which he is alleged to have violated." Id. at 774.
11. 295 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1961).
12. Id. at 759.
13. 302 F.2d 214 (8th Cir. 1962).
14. Id. at 244.
15. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954). "[A]n accused is

not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease
or mental defect." Id. at 874.
16. 312 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
17. Id. at 851. (Emphasis added.)
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ditional "right and wrong" terminology. In Carter v. United States'
a perjury conviction involving the insanity issue was affirmed per
curiam by an equally divided court. The arguments of the dissent
suggest that some members of the court have begun to analyze the
question of behavior in terms of its requisite elements. While emphatically pointing out that "McNaghten is dead,"'19 the dissent was
reluctant to abandon the prevailing requirement for distinguishing
right from wrong. However, the dissent did indicate that perhaps
additional elements of behavior should be considered. The "standard
should concern itself with whether defendant understood and appreciated the act in question and its consequences, and whether it
was a result of a free exercise of will or choice." 20 If "free exercise
of will or choice" can be interpreted as "the capacity to control behavior," then it would appear that the dissent's suggestion in Carter
is an endorsement of the two-pronged test proposed by the American
Law Institute.
The federal courts are not the only disciples of the new ALI following. The Model Penal Code test has been adopted, in whole or
in part, by several state legislatures.1 When Freeman was decided,
for example, two of the three states in the Second Circuit, New York
and Vermont, had previously rejected M'Naghten in favor of statutory substitutes patterned after the ALI test. Recognizing their
enterprise, the Freeman court acknowledged: "It would be incongruous, indeed, if the federal courts which have traditionally concerned themselves with formulating guidelines for fairer trials were
to remain frozen to the old M'Naghten Rules while the state courts
18.

325 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1963).

19. Id. at 707.
20.

Id. at 705.

21. On July 1, 1965, New York State rejected M'Naghten and adopted a test
based largely upon the ALl formulation. N.Y. PEN. LAW §1120 provides: "A
person is not criminally responsible for conduct if at the time of such conduct

as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity to know or
appreciate either: (a) the nature and consequence of such conduct; or (b) that
such conduct was wrong." Until July 28, 1961, statutory law of Illinois contained
no test for criminal responsibility. The state courts followed M'Naghten, supplemented by the "irresistible impulse" test. In 1961 the state legislature on
recommendation of the joint committee to revise the Illinois Code, adopted the

ALl

MODEL PENAL CODE

test verbatim. ILL.

ANN. STAT.

ch. 38, §6-2 (Smith-Hurd

1961). Vermont has provided by statute that "the M'Naghten test of insanity in

criminal cases is hereby abolished." VT.

STAT. ANN.

tit. 13, §4802 (1957). In ad-

dition, Vermont enacted as its rule for determining criminal responsibility, a

formulation strikingly similar to §4.01 of the MODEL PENAL CODE: "A person is
not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of
mental disease or defect he lacks adequate capacity either to appreciate the
criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirement of law."
VT. STAT. ANN. tit.

13, §4801 (1957).
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22
in this Circuit pursued the more modem and enlightened course.."
If the Florida Legislature were to assume the initiative in drafting
similar legislation, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals would find
itself in the same position as was the Second Circuit prior to Freeman.
Legislative reform would not only ameliorate determinations of
criminal responsibility in Florida, but it would also be timely and
helpful to the Fifth Circuit in its efforts to renovate M'Naghten.
The ALI test is certainly not the ultimate in faultless definition.
Perfection is unattainable when dealing with such a fluid and evolving concept as criminal responsibility. Nevertheless, the Institute's
proposal is a manifest improvement over the present M'Naghten
standard. The test is simple yet comprehensive. It may be intelligently charged upon by the judge and easily understood by the
jurors. While it retains the cognitive element of M'Naghten, the ALI
test is equally concerned with the actor's capacity to control his conduct. Finally, the new test is conducive to liberal admissibility of
evidence rather than artificially structured testimony. Under M'Naghten the testifying psychiatrist can be confined by the court to his
opinion whether the defendant could distinguish between right and
wrong at the time of the act. Because such an opinion goes to the
sole inquiry of M'Naghten, it is the psychiatrist's judgment and not
the jury's that determines the issue of insanity. The ALI test
alleviates this predicament by leaving to the jury the determination
whether cognition or control were substantially lacking and not
whether they were simply present or absent. Herein is a frank recognition that there are gradations of degree in any determination of insanity and that such a determination is best left to the common sense
of the jury. In the words of Professor Wechsler, a proponent of the
Model Penal Code: "One would expect jury skepticism and the system
23
is healthier for that jury skepticism."
There need be no misapprehension that the ALI test will produce
a system "soft on criminals" or given to excusing defendants simply
because they had been deprived as children. First, the Code makes it
absolutely clear that mere recidivism or narcotics addiction will not
of themselves justify acquittal.24 Section 4.01 (2) expressly provides
that the terms "mental disease or mental defect" do not include an
abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct. 25 Secondly, a verdict of "not guilty by reason of insanity" would not necessarily allow the offender to go free. Florida

22. United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 624 n.56 (2d Cir. 1966).
23. Annual Judicial Conference, Second Circuit, 1964, Insanity as a Defense,
37 F.R.D. 365, 385 (1964).
24. United States v. Freeman 357 F.2d 606, 625 (2d Cir. 1966).
25. MODEL PENAL CODE §4.01 (2) (Final Draft 1962).
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Statutes, section 919.1126 authorizes the court to commit an accused
acquitted by the jury for the cause of insanity: "[I]f the discharge or
going at large of such insane person shall be considered by the court
."
manifestly dangerous to the peace and safety of the people ....
Adoption of a more liberal test for criminal responsibility could be
conditioned on a more liberal interpretation of the phrase "manifestly dangerous." Courts could use the two laws hand-in-hand to
provide for institutional commitment in marginal cases. The objective in every case would be the same as before - to render the dangerous person harmless. Furthermore, a practice of indefinite commitment would deter "normal" defendants from choosing to defend on
the ground of insanity.
Whatever the choice of wording for a test of criminal responsibility, some reform is due. Blind adherence to an outmoded standard,
sorely at variance with enlightened legal and medical scholarship, can
no longer serve the needs of the present. The American Law Institute has provided an acceptable format. All that remains is for
the legislature to seize the initiative and demonstrate its responsiveness
to changing times.
BRIAN ALEXANDER ROSBOROUGH

26.

FLA. STAT. §919.11 (1965).
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